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Confidence intervals permit, but do not guarantee, better 
inference than statistical significance testing
Melissa Coulson, Michelle Healey, Fiona Fidler and Geoff Cumming*
Statistical Cognition Laboratory, School of Psychological Science, La Trobe University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
A statistically significant result, and a non-significant result may differ little, although significance 
status may tempt an interpretation of difference. Two studies are reported that compared 
interpretation of such results presented using null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), or 
confidence intervals (CIs). Authors of articles published in psychology, behavioral neuroscience, 
and medical journals were asked, via email, to interpret two fictitious studies that found similar 
results, one statistically significant, and the other non-significant. Responses from 330 authors 
varied greatly, but interpretation was generally poor, whether results were presented as CIs or 
using NHST. However, when interpreting CIs respondents who mentioned NHST were 60% 
likely to conclude, unjustifiably, the two results conflicted, whereas those who interpreted 
CIs without reference to NHST were 95% likely to conclude, justifiably, the two results were 
consistent. Findings were generally similar for all three disciplines. An email survey of academic 
psychologists confirmed that CIs elicit better interpretations if NHST is not invoked. Improved 
statistical inference can result from encouragement of meta-analytic thinking and use of CIs but, 
for full benefit, such highly desirable statistical reform requires also that researchers interpret 
CIs without recourse to NHST.
Keywords: email survey, statistical inference, cognition, meta-analytic thinking, confidence intervals
provided in their discussion section a detailed and well-informed 
comparison of NHST and CIs. However they too did not draw on 
any empirical evidence about how researchers use or understand 
the different techniques.
There  is  some  experimental  evidence  about  deficiencies  of 
NHST, as reported for example by Oakes (1986) and Haller and 
Krauss (2002), and such cognitive evidence has been cited in sup-
port of statistical reform by some scholars, for example Kline (2004, 
Chapter 3). On the other hand there is little evidence about how 
CIs are understood, and even less that compares NHST and CIs. 
Fidler and Loftus (2009) conducted one of the few direct com-
parisons of NHST and CIs. They reported empirical evidence that 
CIs can give better interpretations than NHST in some situations. 
Otherwise there has been little experimental study of whether CIs 
can in practice lead to better inference, as reformers claim. The 
aim of the two experiments reported here was to seek evidence 
about how researchers think about and interpret a simple pattern 
of results, as a function of the reporting format – especially NHST 
and CI formats.
From Dichotomous thinking to Estimation thinking
Two of the advantages claimed for CIs are especially relevant. First, 
Meehl (1978) and Gigerenzer (1998) argued that the focus of NHST 
on dichotomous reject or do-not-reject decisions restricts how 
researchers think. They claimed dichotomous thinking, as reinforced 
by NHST, limits the questions researchers ask and even the theo-
ries they develop. They argued that using an inference technique 
(NHST) whose primary outcome is a statement that a result is or is 
not statistically significant leads researchers to formulate questions 
that are similarly impoverished, for example “does the treatment 
We investigated how researchers interpret the pattern of results 
discussed by Gelman and Stern (2006), whose argument is sum-
marized by their title: “The difference between ‘significant’ and 
‘not significant’ is not itself statistically significant” (p. 328). We 
report two email studies of how researchers interpret such results 
when presented in null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), or 
confidence interval (CI) formats.
statistical rEForm
Statistical reformers argue that CIs have strong advantages over 
NHST (e.g., Kline, 2004, Chapter 3; Cumming and Finch, 2005). 
The reformers’ case is compelling, although most of the criticism 
of NHST and advocacy of CIs and other techniques to supplement 
or even replace NHST has focused mainly on theoretical argu-
ments and expected or predicted misconceptions, rather than on 
empirical evidence.
The dearth of cognitive evidence to help guide the NHST debate 
may be one reason why weak and misleading arguments have 
appeared. For example Hagen (1997) argued that “it is unlikely that 
we will ever be able to divorce ourselves from that [NHST] logic” (p. 
22). Thompson (1998) made convincing ripostes to Hagen’s sup-
port of NHST and his criticism of Cohen’s (1994) famous critique 
of NHST. Further, Knapp and Sawilowsky (2001) contended that 
“criticism of null hypothesis testing and subsequent advocacy of 
confidence intervals is simply illogical” (p. 73). Again Thompson 
(2001) replied persuasively, while also reiterating a point that is 
important for the present article: “If we mindlessly interpret a con-
fidence interval with reference to whether the interval subsumes 
zero, we are doing little more than nil hypothesis statistical testing” 
(Thompson, 1998, p. 799). In contrast, Leventhal and Huynh (1996) 
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thE rationalE For our ExpErimEnts
We designed the two experiments reported in this article to provide 
cognitive evidence related to the CI and NHST issues described 
above. In both experiments, the set of results we presented to par-
ticipants comprised results from two similar fictitious studies. The 
two results were in the same direction and of comparable size, but 
one was clearly statistically significant at the 0.05 level, whereas 
the other was not. Results were presented in various NHST or CI 
formats. In our Experiment 1 we first asked an open-ended ques-
tion about how the respondent interpreted the set of results we 
presented. We next asked for ratings on a 1–7 scale in reply to 
more specific questions about what overall conclusion is warranted, 
and the extent to which the respondent thought the two results 
conflicted, or were similar. We then asked for comments about 
how the respondent thought about and answered our questions. 
The results of the first experiment helped us design Experiment 
2, which asked more specifically about how respondents thought 
about particular questions we asked. Note that all our questions, 
in both experiments, asked about interpretation of the whole set 
of results, rather than about either individual study.
We expected dichotomous thinking would prompt respondents 
to see the two studies as conflicting, or not similar, and to regard 
the two studies together as giving poor, or equivocal, evidence of 
an effect. On the other hand, we reasoned that respondents who 
thought quantitatively and adopted meta-analytic thinking would 
be likely to see the two studies as agreeing, rather than conflicting, 
and together as offering quite strong evidence of an effect. We pre-
sented the results in one of four formats –each respondent saw only 
one format – so that any differential prompting of dichotomous or 
meta-analytic thinking by different formats might be revealed. We 
were particularly interested to test the claims of statistical reformers 
that NHST tends to elicit dichotomous thinking, whereas CIs are 
more likely to prompt meta-analytic thinking.
We were mindful of the possibility a respondent could see results 
in one format, yet think at least partly in terms of some other 
representation of the results. For example, a respondent might see 
CIs, yet think primarily in terms of whether or not zero is excluded 
from the interval, and thus whether or not a null hypothesis of 
zero can be rejected. We hoped the discursive answers to our initial 
open-ended question, and the responses to our later invitation for 
general comments, would throw additional light on respondents’ 
thinking.
In Experiment 1, researchers who had published in psychology 
(PSY), behavioral neuroscience (BN), and medical (MED) journals 
were asked by email to interpret the results of our two fictitious 
studies. We chose the three disciplines because of their different 
statistical practices: MED routinely uses CIs but usually not in 
figures, BN routinely uses SE bars in figures but seldom uses CIs. 
PSY makes comparatively little use of either CIs or SE bars (Belia 
et al., 2005). Our respondents saw results presented in one of four 
formats, being the four combinations of NHST or CIs, and as a 
figure or in text.
ExpErimEnt 1: rEsEarchErs in thE thrEE DisciplinEs
We asked respondents to interpret two similar studies. One gave a 
statistically significant (p = 0.02), and the other a non-significant 
(p = 0.22) result in the same direction. NHST and dichotomous 
produce an improvement?” By contrast, CIs provide point and 
interval estimates, which could prompt researchers to ask quan-
titative questions and develop better, more quantitative, theories 
(Cumming and Fidler 2009). Researchers may be prompted to ask 
‘how large an improvement does the treatment give?” (Of course 
the answer may be zero or negative.) Further, asking and answer-
ing such questions may prompt development of theories that are 
more quantitative, for example postulating a particular functional 
relationship between amount of treatment and size of effect, rather 
than theories that merely postulate an unspecified improvement. 
CIs may thus offer a release from dichotomous thinking, and may 
help researchers move beyond that to estimation thinking, which 
emphasizes the sizes of effects.
The argument of Meehl (1978) and Gigerenzer (1998) in favor 
of CIs is appealing, but has not yet, so far as we know, been sub-
jected to empirical test. It is possible, for example, that at least some 
researchers think in terms of effect sizes and amounts, even when 
using NHST. Also, it seems plausible that, if CIs are used merely 
to note whether zero is excluded and therefore a null hypothesis 
can be rejected, habits of dichotomous thinking may suffer little 
disturbance. Empirical investigation is required.
mEta-analytic thinking
The second advantage of CIs that is especially relevant here is their 
provision of a measure of precision. Obtaining statistical signifi-
cance can give a seductive but unwarranted sense of certainty. 
Stating a result is “significant” too easily suggests the effect truly 
exists and even that it is important or large. It is easy to overlook the 
role of sampling variability and the possibility the NHST decision 
is wrong. By contrast, CI width is a measure of precision that pro-
vides an accurate quantification of remaining uncertainty. A nar-
row CI justifies confidence we have reasonably precise knowledge 
about the effect under study. Unfortunately, in psychology power 
is usually low and our CIs are wide, indicating that uncertainty 
is large, whether or not an effect can be pronounced statistically 
significant. As Cohen (1994) stated: “I suspect that the main rea-
son they [CIs] are not reported is that they are so embarrassingly 
large!” (p. 1002).
Obtaining wide CIs may prompt researchers to design better 
and higher-powered studies – which would be an excellent out-
come (Maxwell, 2004). In addition, appreciating the large extent 
of uncertainty should encourage researchers to focus on cumula-
tion of evidence over studies. Schmidt (1996) argued that “any 
single study is rarely adequate by itself to answer a scientific ques-
tion. Therefore each study should be considered as a data point 
to be contributed to a later meta-analysis” (p. 124). Wilkinson 
and the Task Force on Statistical Inference (1999) made a similar 
point by stating that “Comparing confidence intervals from a 
current study to intervals from previous, related studies helps 
focus attention on stability across studies… [and] also helps in 
constructing plausible regions for population parameters.” (p. 
599). For all these reasons, researchers should adopt meta-analytic 
thinking (Cumming and Finch, 2001), which recognizes that a 
single study contributes evidence that needs to be considered 
along with evidence from other studies, past and future. Meta-
analytic thinking is highly desirable, and CIs may help it displace 
dichotomous thinking.www.frontiersin.org  July 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 26  |  3
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NHST text. The data were the same in every case. Comparison of 
the two studies gives p = 0.55, so the difference between the two 
is consistent with sampling variability, and the results should not 
be regarded as conflicting. Figure 2 shows the two results, and 
their meta-analytic combination calculated using a random effects 
model by Comprehensive Meta-Analysis1. The combined result was 
95% CI [0.81, 5.29], p = 0.008, which indicates quite strong evidence 
the new treatment is more effective.
thinking may suggest the two studies gave conflicting results. By 
contrast, CIs show large overlap, so CIs and meta-analytic think-
ing may suggest the two gave consistent results and together gave 
stronger evidence of an effect than either study alone.
mEthoD
Figure 1 presents a vignette describing two fictitious studies that 
compared a new treatment for insomnia with the current treat-
ment. Each used two independent equal-sized groups. The results 
are shown in four formats: CI figure, CI text, NHST figure, or 
Only two studies have evaluated the therapeutic effectiveness of a new treatment for insomnia.  Both 
Simms (2003) and Collins (2003) used two independent, equal-sized groups and reported the 
difference between the means for the new treatment and current treatment.  
 
(CI figure) 
Figure 1 shows these differences with their 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Difference between the means (mean for new treatment minus mean for current treatment) 
for treatments for insomnia in the Simms (2003) and Collins (2003) studies, with 95% confidence 
intervals.  A positive difference indicates an advantage for the new treatment. 
 
(CI text) 
Simms (2003), with total N = 44, found the new treatment had a mean advantage over the current 
treatment of 3.61 (95% Confidence Interval: .61 to 6.61).  The study by Collins (2003), with total N = 
36, found the new treatment had a mean advantage of 2.23 (95% Confidence Interval: -1.41 to 5.87). 
 
(NHST figure) 
Figure 1 shows these differences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Difference between the means (mean for new treatment minus mean for current treatment) 
for treatments for insomnia in the Simms (2003) and Collins (2003) studies.  A positive difference 
indicates an advantage for the new treatment. The p-values refer to a two-tailed test of the difference 
between the means against zero. 
 
(NHST text) 
Simms (2003) found that the new treatment showed a statistically significant advantage over the 
current treatment, M (difference) = 3.61, SD = 6.97, t(42) = 2.43, p = .02.  The study by Collins (2003) 
found no statistically significant difference between the two treatment means, M (difference) = 2.23, 
SD = 7.59, t(34) = 1.25, p = .22. 
Figure 1 | The vignette and four results formats used in experiment 1. Each email included the top introductory description of two fictitious studies, then just 
one of the presentations of results, without the label in parentheses.
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  difference might be attributable to BN and, perhaps MED, but 
cautions that any disciplinary differences have not been clearly 
established. Also, any overall difference between disciplines 
would be small.
The two leftmost columns in Figure 4 show there were 18 (11%) 
Consistent scores of 1 to NHST formats, but only 5 (3.1%) to CI 
formats. Such a Consistent score of 1 can only arise when both S1 
and S3 elicited extreme ratings; in other words, the response to S1 
(“broadly consistent”) was 1, and the response to S3 (“conflicting 
evidence”) was 7. These are the strongest responses that the two 
studies are inconsistent and conflicting – as dichotomous thinking 
suggests. As those columns of Figure 4 show, there were consider-
ably more such scores to NHST formats than to CI formats.
We sent emails to authors of recent articles in leading PSY, 
BN, and MED journals. Any author saw one of the four formats. 
Authors were asked, first, to answer in their own words the ques-
tion “what do you feel is the main conclusion suggested by these 
studies?”, then were asked to rate, on a scale from 1 = strongly 
disagree, to 7 = strongly agree, their attitude to statements S1 
“the results of the two studies are broadly consistent”, S2 “there is 
reasonable evidence the new treatment is more effective”, and S3 
“there is conflicting evidence about the effectiveness of the new 
treatment”. We then asked “how many years ago did you publish 
your first research paper?”
rEsults
We sent 2,322 emails, approximately equal numbers to each dis-
cipline in each format; 190 (8.2%) bounced. Just 330 (15.5% of 
2,132 assumed received) elicited usable replies.
‘Consistent’ scores
As expected, the S1 (“broadly consistent”) and S3 (“conflicting evi-
dence”) scores were negatively correlated, r = −0.64, so we averaged 
the S1 and a reversal of the S3 scores, to give a Consistent score, with 
1 = strong disagreement and 7 = strong agreement the studies are 
consistent and not conflicting. Means and 95% CIs suggested any 
differences between figure and text formats were small, so results 
presented here are combined over that variable. Figure 3 shows 
mean Consistent scores; the overall mean was 4.27 [4.07, 4.46]. 
Figure 4 shows the histograms of Consistent scores, which varied 
greatly over respondents (SD = 1.77). All values of the rating scale 
were well-used.
Combining over disciplines, the difference between the CI 
mean of 4.49, and NHST mean of 4.05 was 0.44 [0.05, 0.82]. 
This is a small difference in the expected direction: CI formats 
were slightly more likely than NHST to suggest the two stud-
ies gave consistent results. The difference can be expressed as 
a Cohen’s d value by dividing it by 1.76, the pooled stand-
ard deviation within CI conditions and NHST conditions, to 
give d = 0.25, which we regard as small. Figure 3 suggests this 
-2 02468
Difference between the means
Simms (Total N = 44)
Collins (Total N = 36)
MA combination
Figure 2 | results of the two studies described in the experimental vignette (see Figure 1), together with the meta-analytic (MA) combination of these 
results. Error bars are 95% CIs.
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Figure 3 | Means and 95% Cis of the Consistent score in experiment 1, for 
six independent groups of respondents combining figure and text formats, 
and for the three disciplines – psychology (PSY), behavioral neuroscience 
(BN), and medicine (MeD) – combining all formats. Responses indicate 
strength of agreement the two studies described in Figure 1 are consistent and 
do not conflict. Sample sizes are shown at the bottom.www.frontiersin.org  July 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 26  |  5
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Effective score: "New treatment is more effective"
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Figure 5 | Means and 95% Cis of the effective score in experiment 1, for 
six independent groups of respondents combining figure and text 
formats, and for the three disciplines – psychology (PSY), behavioral 
neuroscience (BN), and medicine (MeD) – combining all formats. 
Responses indicate strength of agreement there is evidence the new 
treatment is more effective. Sample sizes are as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 6 | Frequency histograms of effective scores in experiment 1. 
Responses indicate strength of agreement the two studies described in 
Figure 1 together provide evidence the new treatment is more effective. 
Histograms are shown for the two NHST display formats combined, and the 
two CI formats combined – in each case for all three disciplines combined.
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Figure 4 | Frequency histograms of Consistent scores in experiment 1. 
Responses indicate strength of agreement the two studies described in 
Figure 1 are consistent and do not conflict. Histograms are shown for the two 
NHST display formats combined, and the two CI formats combined – in each 
case for all three disciplines combined.
‘Effective’ scores
Figure 5 shows the mean S2 scores (Effective scores). Again, inspec-
tion of data led us to combine figure and text formats. The overall 
mean was 3.36 [3.16, 3.56]. Figure 5 suggests any discipline or 
format differences were small. The means for the CI (3.42) and 
NHST formats (3.30) were similar.
Figure 6 shows that again there was great variability over respond-
ents (SD = 1.80). The histograms shown in Figure 6 for the CI and 
NHST formats are similar, both showing great variability.
The correlation between Consistent and Effective scores 
was r = 0.46, and was similar for each discipline, indicating a 
moderate positive relation between seeing the studies as consist-
ent, and agreeing there is evidence the new treatment is more 
effective. The correlation of number of years since first publi-
cation with Consistent scores was negligible, r = 0.07 [−0.04, 
0.18],  as  was  the  corresponding  correlation  with  Effective 
scores, r = .04 [−0.07, 0.15]. These correlations were similar 
for each discipline.
Text responses
Text responses to the initial question were very diverse. Many gave 
evidence of misconception, especially about p values or NHST. We 
content analyzed the responses, and decided that two classifica-
tions would best represent them in relation to our primary aim of 
comparing CI and NHST approaches to inference. First, we coded 
each response as stating or implying the two studies gave similar – 
or consistent or the same – results (e.g., “Both studies found some 
effectiveness of treatment.”, “There is an improved way of treating 
insomnia.”), or gave different or conflicting results (e.g., “…two 
essentially contradictory results”, “conflicting finding”), or did not 
justify either of these options.
Second, we coded responses to the CI formats as mentioning 
NHST (CI-as-NHST, including any mention of p values, signifi-
cance, a null hypothesis, or whether or not a CI includes zero), or 
not (Not-CI-as-NHST). Responses in the latter category may have 
referred to CIs in some other way, perhaps mentioning intervals 
or overlap, or may have made no reference to CIs. We developed 
detailed coding rules, and took care the two classifications relied 
on different terms and so were based on different aspects of a 
response. Two coders independently coded all responses. For 
each coder, the two classifications were undertaken more than Frontiers in Psychology  |  Quantitative Psychology and Measurement    July 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 26  |  6
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classified as Similar. This striking difference of 54.7 percentage 
points [38.7, 67.1] indicates that a respondent interpreting CI 
results who made any mention of NHST in his or her text comment 
most likely (in 60% of cases) also stated the two results differed. In 
contrast, if no mention was made of NHST the respondent almost 
certainly (95%) stated or implied the two results were similar.
Discussion
The best interpretation of our vignette is that the two studies are 
consistent, and together give strong evidence the new treatment 
is more effective. The means in Figures 3 and 5 should have been 
near 6 or 7, rather than 3.5–4.5. Only 29/325 (8.9%) of respondents 
gave 6 or above on both ratings, and only 81/325 (24.9%) gave any 
degree of agreement – scores of 5 or more – on both. The histo-
grams in Figures 4 and 6 indicate ratings were very widely spread, 
and there was a great diversity of text responses. Researchers in 
every discipline, for every format, interpreted the vignette in ways 
that ranged from justifiable judgments, to strong but unjustified 
judgments that the two studies conflict and do not give reasonable 
evidence the new treatment is more effective.
Mean Consistent ratings were slightly higher for CI than NHST 
formats, partly because a number of respondents to NHST for-
mats gave extreme ratings to indicate they judged the two results 
to conflict. There was also a tendency for more CI than NHST 
respondents to give text responses classified as Similar. However 
both these differences were small, and many CI respondents gave 
ratings and text responses indicating difference or conflict between 
the two results in the vignette.
We designed the four formats to be as distinct as possible, 
while still typical of what journals publish. We chose the three 
disciplines because they have different CI and error bar prac-
tices. Yet Figures 3 and 4 show little variation over format or 
discipline. Also, the lack of correlation with number of years 
since first publication is consistent with a conclusion that our 
findings hold across the range from recently trained to highly 
experienced researchers.
We classified 75% of text responses as suggesting the two studies 
gave Similar or Different results. For the CI formats we classified 
90% of text responses as mentioning NHST in some way, or not 
doing so. Figure 7 shows there was a large and striking relation 
between the two classifications. The emails that presented results 
using CIs in a figure or text made no mention anywhere of statisti-
cal significance. Even so, around half (49%) of the text responses 
included in Figure 7 referred to a null hypothesis, a p value, or 
significance as part of the interpretation. Those responses were 
more likely (60%) to suggest the two results in the vignette dif-
fered. The other half made no reference to NHST, and almost all 
(95%) of those text responses justifiably suggested the two results 
were similar.
Our classifications of text responses were designed post hoc. We 
had not expected the CI formats to generate so many interpreta-
tions framed in terms of statistical significance. Given that one of 
our main conclusions, illustrated in Figure 7, is based on these 
classifications, we designed a second experiment to focus on the 
same task, with presentation of the same results vignette just in 
the CI figure format, and ask more specifically about information 
used by respondents to choose their ratings.
a week apart, to reduce any influence of memory for particular 
responses. When making the second classification, the coder was 
blind to the first.
The two coders classified the 330 text responses as similar, differ-
ent or unclassifiable, and agreed in 302/330 (91.5%) cases, Cohen’s 
κ = 0.86. We labeled a response Similar or Different if both coders 
identified it as such. There were 140 text responses labeled Similar 
and 108 labeled Different, in similar proportions for each   discipline. 
Of these, 81/126 (64.3%) text responses to CI formats were Similar, 
slightly more than the 59/122 (48.4%) Similar responses to NHST. 
The difference was 15.9 percentage points [3.6, 27.6]. The cor-
relation of Similar-Different with Consistent scores was r = 0.63. 
The corresponding correlation with Effective scores was r = 0.47, 
confirming Similar text responses tended to go with ratings the 
new treatment is more effective.
For our second classification, the two coders classified the 161 
text responses to CI formats as CI-as-NHST, or Not-CI-as-NHST, 
and agreed in 145/161 (90.1%) cases, Cohen’s κ = 0.80. We labeled a 
text response CI-as-NHST, or Not-CI-as-NHST if the coders agreed. 
There were 64 CI-as-NHST, and 81 Not-CI-as-NHST text responses, 
in similar proportions for each discipline. Even though the CI for-
mat emails made no mention of NHST, in 64/145 (44.1%) cases 
the respondent mentioned NHST in his or her text comments. The 
correlation of this classification of text responses with Consistent 
scores was small, r = −0.22 [−0.37, −0.06], and with Effective scores 
negligible, r = −0.08 [−0.24, 0.08]. There was thus only a small ten-
dency for text responses that mentioned NHST when interpreting a 
CI format to go with ratings indicating the two results conflicted.
We examined the association between the two classifications 
of text responses, for the 112 responses assigned values on both. 
Figure 7 shows that 40.0% of CI-as-NHST responses were classi-
fied as Similar, whereas 94.7% of Not-CI-as-NHST responses were 
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Figure 7 | Percentages of text responses in experiment 1 classified as 
indicating the two studies gave Similar or Different results, for respondents 
classified as referring to NHST (Ci-as-NHST), or not referring to NHST 
(Not-Ci-as-NHST), when interpreting Ci results. Numbers of respondents are 
shown at the bottom. Results are combined for all three disciplines and the two 
CI formats. For each group of respondents, the Similar and Different percentages 
sum to 100, so 95% CIs are shown for only one percentage.www.frontiersin.org  July 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 26  |  7
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Four initial FinDings
Our first main finding is that respondents interpreted the vignette 
in a great variety of ways. The wide histograms of Figures 4 and 6 
and the great diversity of text comments   indicate that respond-
ents not only reached diverse conclusions, but also thought about 
the results in numerous different ways. Some ratings and com-
ments were fully consistent with dichotomous thinking, whereas 
others were consistent with meta-analytic thinking. A researcher 
who reports even the simple and common pattern of results we 
presented should be aware that readers may interpret such a pres-
entation in any of a wide range of ways.
Second, most researchers interpreted the vignette poorly. Respondents 
should have interpreted the two results as consistent and as, together, 
giving quite strong evidence of effectiveness. Figure 2 illustrates both 
those correct inferences. Mean ratings should have been around 6 or 7, 
but Figures 3 and 5 show they were around 3–4.5, near the middle of the 
scale. Only a small proportion of respondents gave both high Consistent 
scores and high Effective scores, as the most justifiable interpretation of 
the results – and meta-analytic thinking – would elicit. Few respondents 
seemed to think meta-analytically and thus see the two results as consist-
ent, and together giving quite strong evidence of an effect.
Third, the four presentation formats made only small differences. 
We expected the CI formats, especially CI figure, would prompt 
better interpretation and less influence of dichotomous thinking, 
but there was only a small difference of 0.44 for the Consistent score 
in Experiment 1 in favor of CI over NHST formats. Interpretation 
by many researchers of CIs in terms of NHST is a likely contributor 
to the smallness of this difference. Moreover, a sizeable minority of 
respondents who saw NHST formats gave a Consistent score of 5 
or more, indicating some level of agreement the two results were 
similar. Further study of their thinking may suggest how NHST 
can be interpreted well.
ExpErimEnt 2: acaDEmic psychologists
We sent emails to academic staff in departments of psychology in 
Australian universities, and asked them questions about results 
presented in the CI figure format.
mEthoD
We used a single email, which included the vignette and results in 
CI figure format, as shown in Figure 1. For each of the S1, S2, and 
S3 statements the respondent was asked to give a 1–7 rating as in 
Experiment 1. For each statement the respondent was also asked to 
give a free text response that described the information on which 
they based their rating.
We obtained from department websites the email addresses of 
academic staff, lecturer and above, for 48 departments of psychol-
ogy of Australian universities. We randomized the combined list, 
then sent emails progressively until we had 50 usable responses.
rEsults anD Discussion
We sent 640 emails of which 72 (11.2%) bounced; 50 (8.8% of 
568 assumed received) elicited usable replies. S1 and S3 scores 
correlated negatively, r = −0.44, so we formed Consistent scores 
as in Experiment 1. The Consistent mean was 4.34 [3.81, 4.86], 
SD = 1.70; and the effective mean 3.95 [3.42, 4.48], SD = 1.72. 
These values are similar to those in Experiment 1.
Two coders independently coded the text responses to the three 
statements. While coding, the coders were blind to the respondents’ 
ratings. We classified each response as emphasizing NHST (e.g., 
mentions of significance, a p value, or a null hypothesis), or CIs 
(e.g., mentions of intervals, interval extent, or overlap), or showing 
neither emphasis. We refer to responses emphasizing NHST or CIs 
as NHST or CI responses, respectively. The coders agreed in 128/145 
(88.3%) cases, Cohen’s κ = 0.79, then resolved disagreements by 
discussion. For the S1 and S3 items, 26/96 (27.1%) had NHST text 
responses, 61/96 (63.5%) had CI text responses, and 9/96 (9.4%) 
showed neither emphasis. Figure 8 shows the frequency histograms 
of ratings, for the S1 and – after reversal – S3 items. Of NHST 
responses, only 2/26 (7.7%) were ratings of 5, 6, or 7, indicating 
the two results in the vignette were judged similar. Of CI responses 
48/61 (78.7%) were ratings of 5, 6, or 7. The difference between the 
two percentages was 71.0 [50.7, 81.1].
The disjunction shown in Figure 8 is consistent with, and 
even more marked than that in Figure 7. If a respondent inter-
preted the CI figure mainly with reference to NHST, they were 
very likely (88%) to interpret the two results as inconsistent or 
conflicting, but if they mainly referred to interval information 
they were likely (79%) to interpret the two results as similar. The 
relation pictured in Figures 7 and 8 is correlational: An NHST 
interpretation of CIs is associated with difference. It seems more 
plausible to attribute causality to the NHST interpretation, rather 
than the judgment of difference, but experimental investigation 
would be valuable.
Discussion anD conclusions
Our  conclusions  must  be  qualified  by  the  low  response  rates, 
although respondents possibly tended to be more statistically con-
fident and knowledgeable than non-respondents. If so, our results 
may underestimate the extent of misconception.
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Figure 8 | Frequency histograms of rating responses in experiment 2 to 
the “broadly consistent” and – after reversal – “there is conflicting 
evidence” statements (that together yield the Consistent score), 
separately for text responses classified as showing an NHST emphasis, 
or a Ci emphasis. Responses indicate strength of agreement the two studies 
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implications For statistical rEForm
Our results suggest that statistical reform in relation to NHST 
and CIs may have to be a two-stage process. The first is to per-
suade, or require, researchers to report CIs wherever possible. This 
stage has often been the focus of reform efforts so far, but Byrd 
(2007), Cumming et al. (2007), and Cumming (2010) presented 
evidence that CIs are seldom reported in psychology and educa-
tion journals. As Thompson (2002) noted, “researchers may not 
fully understand statistical methods that they (a) rarely read in 
the literature and (b) infrequently use in their own work” (p. 26). 
Therefore even this first stage requires further consistent effort, 
although an important recent advance is that the sixth edition of 
the American Psychological Association (APA) Publication Manual 
(APA, 2010) strongly recommends CIs and gives guidelines for 
reporting them.
Confidence intervals have been routinely reported in medical 
journals since the mid-1980s, yet our MED respondents did not 
perform notably better than BN and PSY respondents. Achieving 
the first stage of reform of routine use of CIs is thus unlikely to 
be sufficient. In addition researchers need to think of CIs as inter-
vals, eschew NHST and, when considering more than one interval, 
think meta-analytically. Cumming and Finch (2005) explained four 
approaches to interpreting CIs, only one of which requires a null 
hypothesis or mentions p values. There is ample scope for CIs to 
inform interpretation without any thought of NHST. Especially 
valuable is meta-analytic thinking, which emphasizes the accu-
mulation of evidence over multiple studies – a simple version of 
which we asked of our respondents.
Meta-analysis is rapidly becoming widely accepted and used, 
and this welcome development is encouraged by the greatly 
expanded attention given to meta-analysis in the sixth edition 
of the Manual (APA, 2010), compared with earlier editions. 
Familiarity with meta-analysis emphasizes the value of CIs and 
the near-irrelevance of NHST. Therefore it may be widespread 
acceptance of meta-analysis, rather than exhortation by reform-
ers, that leads to a major swing of emphasis from NHST to CIs. 
However it is achieved, such a highly desirable reform could 
improve the efficiency and quality of research substantially. Our 
results define some of the challenges to be met, especially the 
need not only to use CIs, but to interpret them without recourse 
to NHST.
acknowlEDgmEnts
This research was supported by the Australian Research Council. 
The  authors  are  very  grateful  to  the  respondents,  and  to  Pav 
Kalinowski and Jerry Lai for valuable comments on drafts.
Fourth, overall results were similar for the three disciplines, so 
the different error bar and CI practices of the different disciplines 
seemed to have little influence. In particular, the presumably much 
greater experience of the MED respondents with CIs made little 
if any difference.
how conFiDEncE intErvals arE intErprEtED
The above four conclusions were disappointing as well as some-
what surprising. Most respondents interpreted the simple pattern 
of results poorly, and our independent variables – presentation 
format and discipline – had little effect. CI formats did better than 
NHST, but only by a small amount (d = 0.25). Our next step was 
to seek insight into respondents’ thinking by examining the open-
ended text responses in Experiment 1. We identified post hoc a 
striking and strong association between how respondents who 
saw CI formats interpreted the CIs, and their comments about 
whether the two studies conflicted or not. Results presented in a 
CI format included no reference to NHST, yet in fully 44% of cases 
the respondent invoked NHST, and was likely to see the results as 
conflicting. In stark contrast, as Figure 7 shows, if the respondent 
avoided reference to NHST they were very likely to see the results 
as consistent – a much more justifiable interpretation.
The finding that CIs are interpreted much better if NHST is not 
invoked appeared strongly in the text comments in Experiment 1. 
However it was post hoc. We therefore designed Experiment 2 to focus 
specifically on the CI figure format, and to seek open-ended text 
explanations for the ratings chosen by the respondent. Figure 8 shows 
that Experiment 2 strongly confirmed the association we identified in 
Experiment 1. When interpreting CIs, respondents did much better – 
gave much more justifiable ratings – if they avoided any reference to 
NHST and thought in terms of the intervals and the relation between 
the two intervals presented in the CI figure format.
We emphasize that our task asked respondents to interpret the 
two studies together, and all our discussion and conclusions relate 
to interpretation of the set of two results. Many of the respondents’ 
comments referred to one or other individual study, but all comments 
were made in response to our request for interpretation and ratings 
of the two results together. It was in the context of interpreting our 
two results, with p values of 0.02 and 0.22, that we found mentioning 
of NHST to be associated strongly with poor interpretation of CIs.
It is striking that respondents invoked NHST so frequently, even 
when they saw a figure comprising two intervals, and NHST was 
nowhere mentioned. It seems NHST and its dichotomous thinking 
are so deeply ingrained, at least for many researchers, that such a fig-
ure is not always sufficient to prevent NHST springing to mind. Alas, 
when it does intrude it is likely to prompt poor interpretation.www.frontiersin.org  July 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 26  |  9
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